THE ORIGINS OF AN ENDURING MYTH: 
THE POGROMS OF 1881–1882 
IN THE BRITISH POPULAR NARRATIVE

Abstract: John Klier’s final monograph, Russians, Jews and the Pogroms of 1881-1882, published posthumously by Cambridge University Press in 2009, primarily tackles and challenges, in meticulous detail, an enduring myth; the notion that the Tsarist regime was guilty of deliberately perpetrating the pogroms of 1881-1882. In one chapter, he analyses the Western responses to the pogroms, considering, amongst many things the response of the British press. In particular, he argues that the populist Jewish World, published in London, was responsible in large part for disseminating the idea that Russia’s rulers had set upon a calculated policy of anti-Jewish violence. This was compounded by a series of articles published in The Times, an internationally respected newspaper whose opinions and reportage were often taken at face value.

This paper takes this thesis a step further by setting the Anglo-Jewish and wider British response within its broader context. In particular, it examines a wide range of sources, especially national and provincial newspapers, and argues that the British narrative, both Jewish and non-Jewish, did not immediately move to implicate the Tsar and his ministers in 1881. Instead, it was a gradual process, occurring over many months. Instrumental in the myth’s formulation was the Warsaw pogrom of December 1881. Why was the Warsaw pogrom so important in formulating, or at least, consolidating the myth? Did British observers, for instance, draw significance from the motivations and consequences of anti-Jewish violence in a ‘different’, Catholic, more ‘Western’ part of the Empire? Or were there other factors that led to the wholesale adoption of the conspiratorial position? These are some of the question this paper considers and seeks to answer.

Keywords: Russian empire; 1881-1882 pogroms; Britain; Jews; newspapers.
MYTHOLOGY AND THE POGROMS OF 1881–1882

Historians have found it difficult to eradicate the popular notion that tsar Alexander III was a deliberate and calculated pogrom-monger. Notwithstanding the meticulous research of modern East European Jewish historiography, the belief that the pogroms in the Russian Empire in 1881-1882 were executed as a government policy continues to find widespread credence in, for example, the historiography of Western European antisemitism and in the Jewish collective memory. The reasons for the myth’s endurance are not difficult to discern. In the first place, the founding fathers of East European Jewish historiography played a hugely significant role in tracing a pattern of anti-Jewish persecution from the pre-modern to the modern period. Shimon Dubnow, for instance, described
the pogroms as “legislative” and a “tsarist policy”.
Elias Tcherikower, though primarily concerned with the violence of a later period, similarly viewed the pogrom as a top-down process. Salo W. Baron, who eschewed the ‘lachrymose conception’ of Jewish history embraced by both Dubnow and Tcherikower, nevertheless upheld the conspiratorial theory of the pogroms.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the theory seemingly travelled with Russian and Polish Jewish emigrants to the New World and Western Europe, and filtered into a Jewish collective memory that invariably reads the historical narrative back to front. As for the historiography of Western European antisemitism, and, it might be said, other historiographies, the reliance on deterministic interpretations of not only the Jewish, but also the non-Jewish experience, remain the paramount consideration when observing the mysterious, impenetrable and peripheral East. The accusation that the Tsarist regime was guilty of implementing a destructive policy of anti-Jewish violence during an era when civil emancipation had already been achieved by Western European Jewry, simply conforms to widely held notions about Russian imperial backwardness.

But the myth that the pogroms were state instituted did not originate with Dubnow, or, of course, in Western European historiography. Neither was its earliest dissemination undertaken by Jewish emigrants. In his final monograph, Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881–1882, John Klier traces the genesis of the myth in the immediate reactions to the pogroms of 1881-1882, in both the Russian Empire and the wider world. In the Russian context,


he notes the role of the Jewish press in formulating a conspiracy theory that attributed blame to the highest echelons of the Tsarist bureaucracy. He also cites the part played by the internal musings and analyses of leading Petersburg Jews, in particular two memoranda written in 1882. The first, the Gintsburg Memorandum presented to the Tsar on 22 March 1882 (OS), ‘established a template for attacks’ on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, thereby implying that the forces of order had failed to quell the pogroms as a consequence of official directives. The Levin Memorandum, written sometime between May and June 1882 (OS) and which spoke of ‘dark forces’ at work in the Empire, revealed in some detail the mechanisms by which the pogrom policy operated. According to Klier, it was the latter memorandum especially that aided in the embrace of the pogrom myth in Russian and Western received opinion; not by coincidence, it was often referred to by Dubnow.3

Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881–1882 also argues that Western European opinion assisted in formulating the pogrom myth, particularly in the British empire. For Klier, the crucial component to the myth’s propagation in London was the intensive reportage of two newspapers, The Times and the Jewish World. In early 1882, both publications, the first of which made a not unjustifiable claim to be the world’s leading newspaper, published a good deal of damning evidence that revealed the regime’s culpability in perpetrating pogroms in the Russian Empire’s Western Provinces and the Kingdom of Poland.6 As a consequence, such was the import of The Times’ coverage, a public meeting was convened. The tone of this impressive gathering, attended by the great and good, was wholly condemnatory and subsequent debates in the press laid full responsibility for the violence at the door of the Russian government. In Klier’s view, the pogrom was thereby established as an essential part of Russian imperial statecraft.7 The actions in London prompted a good deal of consternation in St.Petersburg. In responding to British efforts to claim the moral high ground, Russian officials, most notably Minister of the Interior N.P. Ignatiev, were only too willing to suggest that Britain ought to get its own house in order before preaching to others on matters of an internal nature. After all, what was the intractable Irish problem but a Jewish question with another name?8

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In formulating his analysis, Klier noted that the conspiratorial legend of the pogrom was swiftly and widely accepted in British discourse. This was precluded by the nigh universal belief that the subjects of the Tsar’s realms had barely been troubled by modernity. In February 1880, for instance, *The Times* described Russia as ‘a backward country, which has not yet worked its way to the level of European life’. To be sure, this was an interpretation interwoven in most British examinations of the Russian Empire. The novelist Charles Reade, writing in early 1882, observed that Russians were ‘barbarians governed by varnished savages, [...] picture-worshipping idolaters and cowardly murderers’. However, although widespread, the superior stance inherent in any British interpretation of Russian life did not in itself determine the wholesale embrace of the pogrom myth. On the contrary, there was a good deal of discussion in the British narrative, both *pro* and *contra*, before it was finally accepted that the regime was indisputable guilty of pogrom-mongering. Indeed, whilst the British press only gradually embraced the pogrom legend, over a period of twelve months or so, at no point was it a theory condoned by Her Majesty’s Government. Likewise, pockets of parliament remained unwilling to conform to the popular narrative.

This paper considers the route taken by the British popular narrative in acceding to the pogrom myth in early 1882. It begins with an examination of initial responses to the Elisavetgrad pogrom in April 1881 and the patterns of interpretation that were subsequently generated. As will be seen, in these stages, there was no universal British response to the ensuing incidents of violence in Kherson, Kiev and Chernigov provinces. Indeed, it was not until almost a year later, in February and March 1882, that direct indictment of the Tsarist regime became a commonplace feature of British reportage. This was a undoubtedly a consequence of events occurring in the Kingdom of Poland in December 1881. From a British perspective, the Warsaw pogrom, which took place over three days during Christmas, was more important than any other pogrom in determining the guilt of the Russian government. It certainly encouraged some of the most lurid and dramatic reportage of the pogroms. But why? Were events in the Kingdom of Poland considered more intrinsically important than those in the southern provinces of the Tsarist Empire? Or are there alternative explanations? These and other questions will be considered below.

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10 *Pall Mall Gazette*, 23/I/1882: 4. Charles Reade (1814–1884) was a playwright and novelist, practically forgotten today, but in his time he was well known in the United Kingdom.
THE BRITISH CONTEXT

Why is it important to consider British responses to the pogroms of 1881-1882? Why might it matter, both in terms of the contemporary and historiographical context? At first glance, it might be wondered, for instance, whether the British reaction, formulated almost two thousand miles from the violence in the Tsarist Empire’s southern provinces, mattered a single jot to the victims or the perpetrators. Undoubtedly, it did. From the Jewish perspective, both within and without the Russian Empire, the British response was important on two interlinked levels; the philanthropic and humanitarian. In the latter part of 1881, the Anglo-Jewish community created an organisation, the Russo-Jewish Committee (RJC) whose specific remit was to collect and distribute funds to aid homeless and destitute pogrom victims. This fund remained in existence until the early twentieth century, by which time it had aided many Jews and their communities in the Tsarist Empire during times of hardship. The RJC’s establishment marked, or at least reiterated, Anglo-Jewry’s efforts to play a significant role in ameliorating the condition of its coreligionists throughout the world. These concerns had begun a decade earlier, with the founding of the Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA), basically the British arm of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. These two organisations, the RJC and AJA, were concerned with much more than emergency relief. Akin to other Jewish organisations of the period, they aimed to remedy the so-called ‘Jewish question’ from within, by promoting education and self-help programmes. The response to 1881-1882, therefore, was extremely important in the matter of Anglo-Jewish self-perception.

Additionally, in the continental context, the British reaction was certainly important to the Tsarist government. In 1881, Britain was not a small island. It lay, in fact, at the heart of a vast Empire upon which, as even Britons who were schooled in the 1970s learnt, the ‘sun never set’. British imperial achievements and ambitions, and the sense of security and self-worth this stimulated, ensured that its statesmen were able to stride across the international stage with confidence. In the 1880s, it occupied a crucially important place in the complex European diplomatic scene, particularly in the wake of recent German aggrandisement and the overshadowing of a grossly divided France. At this point, Queen Victoria’s dominion essentially stood alone, though hardly with misgivings nor disinterest in its neighbours both near and far. A long-term enmity with the Russian Empire ensured that foreign and domestic manoeuvrings in St. Petersburg were forever warily eyed from London. It was no doubt for this reason, at least in part, that British diplomatic officials in the Tsarist Empire undertook a detailed analysis of the pogroms, which resulted
in the publication of two parliamentary Command Papers (or ‘Blue Books’, as they are sometimes called) in 1882. In order to understand one’s imperial rival, one’s past and potential enemy, it was surely essential to see how things operated deep within the dark Russian interior.

In a different aspect, the British response to 1881-1882 is certainly important when considering the processes by which print journalism operated and the degree of sophistication it had attained by this time. Despite the geographical gulf that separated Britain from the Russian Empire, the telegraph and various advances in print technology brought these two worlds closer together. News of the first pogrom in Elisavetgrad took just six days to find its way into the columns of several British newspapers, both metropolitan and provincial. By the 1880s, there was hardly a corner of the United Kingdom without a representative newspaper. Even the most apparently locally-orientated newspapers, such as the Aberdeen Journal (Scotland), the Leeds Mercury (West Yorkshire) and the Northern Echo (Darlington, north-east England), contained editorials, letters from correspondents and reportage dedicated to the pogroms. Such a reaction and the degree to which it was broadcast and interconnected across the British Isles, reflected an increasing interest in the world beyond the local, the county and the national.

Naturally, British print journalism in the 1880s was particularly significant in determining internalised visions of national, ethnic and religious otherness. In relation to 1881-1882, though, there was effectively a double bind. After all, where were the most singular lines of otherness to be delineated? Did British observers consider the Russian gentile less or more exotic than the Russian Jew? Sometimes the precise orientation of these attitudes was difficult to discern. A truly significant answer to this question only really coalesced once the pogroms threatened to provoke a mass exodus of Jews from the Russian Empire, who, it was feared, might seek to make a new life in the United Kingdom. Although this was more imagined than real, since relatively few Jews arrived on British shores in the 1880s (especially when compared with the 1890s), it was a widespread anxiety that prompted a closer scrutiny of the Russian Jew and the Jewish question. Consequently, the response to 1881-1882 laid the foundations for future British attitudes towards the Russian and Polish Jew. It ensured that any recurrence of anti-Jewish persecution in

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12 The greatest imperial flashpoint between Russia and Britain at this time was in Central Asia, particular Afghanistan. There was also concern over Russian interference in South-East Europe, as evidence in its war against the Ottoman Empire in the late 1870s, see: Siegel J. Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia. London, 2002; Neilson K. Britain and the Last Tsar. British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917. Oxford, 1995.
the Tsarist Empire inherently carried a domestic resonance. For British public opinion, what happened to the Russian Jew mattered and this continued to be the case for many decades to come.

THE INITIAL RESPONSE: MAY-JULY 1881

On 3 May 1881, a London newspaper, the Morning Post, published a short paragraph detailing four hundred arrests in Elisavetgrad, Kherson province, as a consequence of unspecified ‘excesses’. This report appeared just six days after the pogrom occurred. It was somewhat exaggerated in the number of arrests that were made, an initial feature that was to characterise swathes of British reportage of 1881-1882. By 10 May 1881, information about a series of ‘disorders’ (the word pogrom was never used by the British press in this period) in Kiev appeared in the columns of three other London newspapers. Again, there was little instructive material to be gleaned from these reports, though the destruction hinted at already seemed incredible; five hundred had been arrested and, in trying to turn back the tide of mob violence, troops had opened fired on the crowds.

By the end of May 1881, British reportage gathered momentum as more details emerged from Russia. What interpretations were proffered in these early stages and who was to blame? In essence, by the late May 1881 British analyses took three lines of enquiry, none of which suggested that the Tsarist regime had set upon an orchestrated course of anti-Jewish violence. In the first place, observers made a connection between events in Russia and those that occurred in Imperial Germany in early 1881, when, amongst other things, a synagogue had been burnt to the ground in Neustettin. It appeared, at first glance, as though these incidents were linked and the violence in Russia was a foreign import. Somewhat simplistically, it was believed that these events were not merely coincidental in their targets and outcome. A leading Anglo-Jewish newspaper, the London-based Jewish World, accused Russian perpetrators of ‘putting into practice the theories of their German friends’.

13 Morning Post, 3/V/1881: 5.
The second explanation similarly relied upon a belief that external provocation had played a part in the violence. In many reports, proclamations, pamphlets and placards apparently encouraged attacks on Jews. Widespread rumours of an imminent attack were also evidenced in the reportage, which were apparently organised by nihilists. At this moment, in the British narrative ‘nihilist’ was an aphorism that covered a multitude of revolutionary and rebellious sins. Any anti-Tsarist action, whether of a physically or verbally violent orientation, was regarded as nihilist. It is no surprise, therefore, that the pogromshchiki were deemed to be troublemaking outsiders, who aimed to rouse the ordinarily passive peasant from his slumbers. Many reports in May and June 1881 emphasised nihilist incitement and the London Daily Telegraph, for example, believed the Odessa pogrom of 3 May 1881 (OS) was initiated by Muscovites.

The nihilist explanation encouraged further examination of the pogroms’ origins, in particular the role of the peasant. Since the general British interpretation of Tsarist life relegated its social strata to the medieval period, it was widely believed that Russia contained only peasants, bureaucrats and nobles. The ramifications of this adherence to times past bore consequences beyond the social and economic, most particularly in the matter of the peasantry’s worldview. Not unlike many Russian observers of those period, British commentators characterised the peasant as superstitious, childlike, credulous, ignorant and, invariably, inebriated. This would prove of particular significance during the pogroms because, unlike their social betters, the peasantry regularly came into contact with Jews. It was for this very reason that peasants had been targeted by nihilists. The Morning Post, for instance, described the ‘social incendiaries’ in Russia who had been able to ‘use in great measure the superstitious rancour and sectarian haste of the ignorant muzhiks against the Israelites, it is now an open secret that the attack on the Jews is only part of a gigantic intrigue for revolutionising the lower strata of Muscovite society’.

Nevertheless, nihilists were not the originators of anti-Jewish animosity amongst the peasantry, they merely encouraged it. Every mainstream British newspaper expressed a belief in the unbalanced nature of social and economic

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20 Daily News, 16/V/1881: 8; Daily Telegraph, 21/V/1881: 5.
22 Morning Post, 26/V/1881: 4.
relations between Jews and peasants. A striking phrase in *The Scotsman* (Edinburgh) explained the matter thus: ‘[the peasantry] look upon the Jew as the vampire that sucks their life-blood’. In other words, the Jew fulfilled a role as the exploiter of the ‘semi-barbarian’ peasant’s weaknesses in the countryside. Several newspapers considered the ancient accusation of Jewish usury as a reason for the pogroms. According to *The Graphic* (London), had the peasant been sufficiently articulate to express his frustration in words, his complaint would be: ‘with us the Jews swarm, they shirk hard work whenever they can, they have a genius for money-lending and they have got our poor peasants in their nets.’ But instead of voicing his protest, the peasant was able only to seek retribution through violence. Although could not be justified, there was reason behind the peasants’ actions: ‘Make what excuses we will’, said *The Graphic*, but ‘money-lending will never be popularly regarded as a reputable way of getting a living’. A Catholic newspaper, *The Weekly Register* (London), agreed: ‘[the violence] is probably a sort of inarticulate expression, among a population who have no means but insurrection in making their grievances known, against the absorbing predominance of a wealthy class [i.e. Jews] who have gradually and insensibly become the possessors of a large share of the property of the country.’ Even the Anglo-Jewish press, who naturally decried the accusation of usury, nevertheless believed that there was something ‘unsettled’ in the Jewish-gentile relationship in the Russian countryside. ‘Bitter anti-Jewish feeling’ was an inherent characteristic of the Russian peasant, according to the *Jewish World*.

Aspects of peasant participation in the violence were emphasised by the earliest visual representations of the pogroms, which appeared in the *Illustrated London News* in June 1881 (See appendix, figures 1 & 2). The first of these depicted the peasant mob in Kiev, striding aggressively towards their unseen target. Almost every man (no women appeared in this scene, save for a single bystander) carried a weapon of some kind, which were all agricultural or workmen’s tools; a hand-axe, a pickaxe, as well as sticks and even, apparently, a broom. The movement of the image suggested a mass of

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23 *The Scotsman*, 14/V/1881: 8.
24 Daily Telegraph, 14/V/1881: 5.
26 The Graphic, 28/V/1881: 514.
28 Jewish World, 6/V/1881: 4-5.
individuals propelled forward; the Jewish victim (the only hatless figure in the scene), at the front of the mob, stumbled under the pressure of those behind him. As for the second image, it imagined the aftermath of an attack on a ‘brandy-shop’. Here the Russian peasant was visualised in his conventional drunken pose. Barrels of brandy were overturned, the shop utterly ransacked (a window was broken), and a peasant greedily heartily from a large pot. His compatriots were strewn about the scene in various degrees of inebriated stupor. In the foreground, one peasant even appeared to be vomiting (or drinking spilt alcohol?). Each image depicted the Russian peasant in traditional attire, with high boots, smocks, fur hats and footcloths. To be sure, these representations entirely conformed to the regular, deeply embedded British stereotype of the Russian peasant. Two aspects of these images are, however, especially striking. In the first image, for instance, the presence of the forces of order should be noted and will be discussed below. Moreover, in both images, just one Jew appears. For this observer, therefore, the central characters in this seedy drama were the peasants, with the place of the victims of lesser import. Thus, this interpretation of the pogroms suggested that the other-worldliness of the peasant, not the Jew, was the most significant.

At this early stage, where did the authorities fit into the British interpretation? Certainly, some analysis was undertaken, as evidenced in the first image from the Illustrated London News, titled ‘assault on a Jew in the presence of the military’. Here, as in other interpretations, it appeared as though the authorities were somewhat passive in the face of the violence. Nevertheless, despite these tacit accusations of ineffectiveness, there was no overt implication that the authorities in St. Petersburg were complicit or had deliberately planned the violence. In May and June 1881, the pogroms were not represented as ‘an essential part of Russian imperial statecraft’. On the contrary, officials in the capital and various provincial governors were reported as having instigated both preventative and remedial measures. Notwithstanding the Illustrated London News’ perspective, Kiev’s governor, General Aleksandr Drenteln, was elsewhere reported as having ensured that ‘energetic measures [were] taken by the authorities to protect’ the Jews.31 Martial law was also proclaimed in Kishinev, Bessarabia, troops were observed bivouacking in the streets of Odessa and, as was noted in Ekaterinoslav, sometimes they opened fire on the crowds and made hundreds of arrests.32

In late May 1881, the London Daily News noted that: ‘There is no reason to believe that the Russian authorities, whatever else may be said against them, attach too little importance to the forcible maintenance of order; and the

31 Morning Post, 4/V/1881: 5.
despatch of troops to the localities where the worst outrages have occurred is a satisfactory symptom of vigour.’  

Reports of various courts martial were published throughout the British press in early June, with many pogromshchiki found guilty. Tsarism appeared utterly intent on punishing attacks on Jews, intending also that the full force of the law would act as a deterrent in the future. However, although there was no suggestion of a policy at this moment, it was evident to British commentators that the Tsarist regime was guilty in other ways. Its policy with regard to the ‘Jewish question’ signalled the Russian street that it was acceptable to despise the Jew. There was, it was noted, a ‘strikingly significant animus inspiring the Emperor’s advisors to treat the Children of Israel, no matter what their nationality or social status, as enemies of the Russian state’. It was hardly surprising, in turn that the ‘grossly ignorant’ felt compelled to punish the Jew.

By late June 1881, however, there was one newspaper that began to take an entirely different perspective. This was the populist Jewish World, who suspected that it was ‘not in the interests of the regime to remove existing prejudice against the Jews’ in Russia, as it suited a sinister purpose. In a blistering editorial the World laid its cards on the table in no uncertain terms: ‘we hold, and fearlessly assert that the Russian government and the Russian government alone, are responsible for the outrages to which the Jews have been and are being subjected. [...] the ignorant muzhik is only imitating the conduct of his leaders [and] will never learn the lesson of tolerance towards the Jews whilst the government inculcate it by example’. Although this did not in itself suggest a deliberate policy, it nevertheless inculcated a belief that the regime was ultimately responsible for the violence. This notion was reconfirmed in the World’s subsequent actions, with the hiring of a special correspondent who was sent to the Tsarist Empire in June 1881.

For John Klier, this correspondent, who was likely to have been one Meier Bankarovich, was crucial in determining the British narrative’s embrace of the pogrom myth. Certainly, there is a good deal of truth to this assertion, since Bankarovich’s weekly columns provided some sensationalist accounts, in which countless babies and children were burnt to death, hundreds of women

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37 Jewish World, 3/V/1881: 5.
38 As will be discussed, the Jewish World’s correspondent’s work was syndicated to other British newspapers and was attributed to Bankarovich. A Jewish newspaper in the Russian Empire, Russkii Evrei, noted the visit of an émigré journalist called Bankarovich, see Klier J. Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881–1882: 400.
were horrifically rapes and tortured, and entire villages razed to the ground.\textsuperscript{39} The sensibilities of the readers were spared nothing. Accompanying this grisly detail was a repeated assertion that the regime had undertaken to deliberately provoke this misery. Local newspapers, financially in hock to the government, as well as the police and the military, were, according to Bankarovich, responsible for organising the pogroms at St. Petersburg’s behest.\textsuperscript{40} In late July 1881, an editorial in the \textit{Jewish World} observed that the ‘Russian atrocities are absolutely \textit{sui generis}. They were deliberately got up in a time of peace against quiet traders and order-loving citizens by persons legally and morally responsible for their protection. [...] We plainly and publically impeach the Russian official class as directly responsible for the late enormities in Kiev.’\textsuperscript{41}

However, the opinions espoused by the \textit{Jewish World} did not acquire universal acceptance in 1881. This was not even the case in other components of the Anglo-Jewish narrative, such as the \textit{Jewish Chronicle}, which was intrinsically linked to the community’s establishment. In September 1881, in the wake of recent pogroms, a leading member of the Anglo-Jewish community appealed in \textit{The Times} for donations to the relief fund for the victims. In explaining the recurrence of violence in Imperial Russia, Louis Cohen cited official indifference at local level, but decried any involvement of the Imperial regime in the violence.\textsuperscript{42} At the end of 1881, it was only in the columns of the \textit{World} that the conspiratorial perspective on the pogroms held sway. All this would change in the wake of the Warsaw pogrom.

\textbf{THE WARSAW POGROM: Merging Narratives}

By the end of December, the first, somewhat confused reports about the Warsaw pogrom’s origins appeared in the British press.\textsuperscript{43} Inevitably, the \textit{Jewish World} expressed its own view of these events in no uncertain terms: ‘the whole affair turns out to have been, just as in the case of the South Russian atrocities, a planned business.’\textsuperscript{44} In mid-January 1882, it published an editorial suggestively entitled ‘the secret springs of anti-Judaism in Russia’. Again, blame was attributed to ‘official tyranny’, which was vividly compared to a ‘large snake [...] twined round the national life, crushing it in its deadly folds,

\textsuperscript{39} For a selection of individual pieces, see Jewish World, 15/VI/1881: 4-5; 5/VII/1881: 5-6; 26/VIII/1881: 5–6; 9/IX/1881: 5-6; 16/X/1881: 5-6; 23/X/1881: 5-6; 26/IX/1881: 5-6.
\textsuperscript{40} Jewish World, 8/VII/1881: 5-6; 15/VII/1881: 5-6; 5/VIII/1881: 5-6; 26/VIII/1881: 5–6; 26/VII/1881: 5-6.
\textsuperscript{41} Jewish World, 22/VII/1881: 4–5.
\textsuperscript{42} Louis Cohen to The Times, 30/VII/1881: 9.
\textsuperscript{43} St James’s Gazette, 26/XII/1881: 8: this was republished from a report in the Evening Standard; Daily Telegraph, 29/XII/1881: 4.
\textsuperscript{44} Jewish World, 6/I/1882: 4–5.
while besliming it with its filthy slaver, and poisoning it with its venomous breath’. 45

British interest in events in the tsar’s realm were of renewed interest by mid-January 1882. And, in contrast to the previous year, almost every newspaper and journal determined that violence was officially directed. An article that appeared in The Times was fundamental to this, and it was syndicated to a number of newspapers, including the Aberdeen Journal, Leeds Mercury, the Glasgow Herald and the Bristol Mercury (south-west England). 46 The author was the historian Joseph Jacobs, a prominent figure in London Jewish society, who was also involved RJC. He clearly took Bankarovich’s accounts at face value and, indeed, he repeated almost verbatim some of the most tragic events described in the World. For example, he told of children being ‘dashed to death, or roasted alive in their own homes’, the raping of thirty women at Elisavetgrad alone, and the ‘razing of whole streets inhabited by Jews’. 47

Subsequently, several provincial newspapers published articles derived from the Jacob/Bankarovich accounts. 48 Edinburgh’s Scotsman was concerned that the testimony might be embellished (rape and the murder of children was evidently impossible to comprehend), but it also asserted that the Russian political classes were pursuing their ‘own personal or political ends’, which could be ‘served by a crusade against the Hebrew community’. 49 Other editorials agreed. By the end of January 1882 there was a single story to tell in relation to Russia’s anti-Jewish violence. The peasantry remained the perpetrators, those most culpable in the terrorising Russia’s Jews, as evidenced in the bizarre front cover of the Penny Illustrated News, which even included a figure with tell-tale horns derived from Michelangelo’s statue of Moses (see appendix, figure 3). But it was Tsarist officials who had planned and encouraged the pogroms. The responsibility, moral and otherwise lay wholly with them.

Some newspapers were hesitate to totally believe the brutality reported by Jacobs/Bankarovich. The Birmingham Daily Mail thought the outrages had been ‘represented in too lurid a light’. At the same time, it did not doubt that the pogroms had been ‘instigated by the state’. 50 Likewise, the Morning

47 The Times, 11/I/1882: 4; see also editorial in this issue: 9; the second article, appeared on 13/I/1882: 4. These articles were soon published as pamphlet: Russian Atrocities, 1881. Supplementary Statement Issued by the Russo-Jewish Committee, London: Wertheimer, 1882.
50 Birmingham Daily Mail, 25/I/1882: 2; see also Morning Post, 2/II/1882: 4, which
Post wrote of the authorities’ ‘connivance’. The Spectator (London), though, believed there had been an underestimation in the number of rapes. In contrast, the Pall Mall Gazette (London) viewed the ‘accounts of violations [as] pure inventions’. The Pall Mall Gazette later published two articles, written by an anonymous correspondent in St. Petersburg, which largely conformed to other accounts. The Jewish World was cognisant of the widespread acceptance of the regime’s culpability and understood that its own role had been instrumental.

Was the Jewish World’s reportage the only factor in encouraging acceptance of the pogrom myth? In this respect, the Polish context was of as much importance, given that in the British popular imagination it was regarded in different terms to Russia proper. In the view of the Daily Telegraph, Poland was ‘by far the most advanced and cultivated portion of the Tsar’s dominions’. Although Poland was Catholic, it was believed that there was a greater affinity in culturally terms with Britain. Additionally, British observers believed there was less anti-Jewish animosity in Poland, and credited it with a tolerance unthinkable in the Russian context. Thus, in Poland, external encouragement was essential, as Poles were naturally disinclined to attack their Jewish neighbours. For this reason, British reports identified individuals responsible for the violence in Warsaw as ‘well-dressed men of Russian origin’. There was no consideration, however, as to what the tsarist regime might hope to profit from the disorder, especially in a part of the Russian empire that was regularly subject to interference from St. Petersburg. Having quelled a Polish rebellion in 1863, less than two decades prior to the empire, tsarism had little to gain from encouraging mass violence on the streets of Warsaw or any other Polish city.

What consequences did the Warsaw pogrom and the subsequent absorption of the conspiratorial viewpoint have for the British context? Undoubtedly, one direct outcome was the public meeting held in February 1882. There had actually been proposals for an organised public action in May and June 1881, but they had met with little enthusiasm. In January 1882, there was evident appetite for broader actions, reflected in a number of letters to various newspapers, including one from the Earl of Shaftesbury, a leading and much respected political figure of the period, in The Times.
The protest was eventually held on 1 February 1882, in London’s Mansion House, home of the Lord Mayor and located at the heart of the imperial capital’s financial district. Present were a number of influential men from in late Victorian society. Shaftesbury was there, as was Cardinal Henry Manning, Catholic leader of England, and Dean William Farrar was present instead of the Archbishop of Canterbury. There were numerous MPs, both Jewish and non-Jewish. Letters were read out from Alfred Tennyson, the poet laureate, and Hugh Grosvenor, the Duke of Westminster. However, despite the Jewish cause championed by the meeting, it was a Christian message that was stressed. Indeed, the AJA advised regional branches that when organising ‘indignation meetings’ they were to be ‘convened by Christians’ and Jewish speakers were to ‘confine themselves to proposing and seconding votes of thanks to the respective chairmen’. In the wake of the London meeting, a number of noteworthy gatherings were held outside the capital. Those convened in Glasgow and Manchester in late January were especially well-attended and unanimous in their condemnation of Tsarist policy.

In March 1882, Baron Henry de Worms, a Jewish MP, presented a resolution to seek direct UK government intervention in Russian affairs to ‘prevent the recurrence of similar acts of violence’. Like many newspaper editorials, he indicated in graphic detail of the Russian atrocities, further underlining the importance of Bankarovich/Jacobs. He also accused the Tsarist government of having ‘connived’ in the outrages. But de Worms’ indignation was undoubtedly stimulated by the recent publication of the two ‘Blue Book’ reports by the British government. Despite Worms’ protestations, the UK government preferred to be more cautious in publically lambasting the St. Petersburg authorities, especially as the diplomatic reports contained in the Blue Book were clear in their view that the pogroms were not a policy. Thus, despite a widespread popular acceptance of a deliberate pogrom policy in Russia, not every British institution accepted that the tsarist regime had begat the violence.

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59 AJA Minute Book, 24/I/1882: 13, Anglo-Jewish Association Archives, Special Collections, University of Southampton, UK, MS137/A95/ADD/2.
61 Hansard, Vol. 267, 1882: 30–70.
In mid-1890, a series of reports in the British press indicated that the tsarist regime was again on the offensive against the empire’s Jews. St. Petersburg had made it clear that the so-called May Laws would be implemented to the letter, which meant that any Jews residing outside of the Pale of Settlement faced immediate expulsion. It also exposed the same threat to Jews residing without permission in certain cities inside the Pale, such as Kiev. The Times and other newspapers detailed import of the 1882 May Laws, and correspondents described Russia as heading towards another ‘chapter in the annals of despotism’. In the view of the Leeds Mercury a ‘war of extermination’ had been instigated, inferring consequences more dire than those experienced in 1881-2.

On 10 December 1890, another public meeting was convened in London in opposition to Tsarist Russia’s Jewish policy. This time it was held at Guildhall, round the corner from Mansion House. It was a response to the ever-worsening legal position of Russian Jewry, particularly in relation to residence restrictions. Once again, the meeting was populated predominantly by Christians, including the Duke of Westminster and the Bishop of Ripon. Within months, notwithstanding British admonitions, the Jewish situation in Russia disintegrated further. In April 1891, Tsar Alexander III issued an edict ordering the expulsion of the Jews of Moscow, which occurred on the first day of Passover, though it is doubtful the authorities intended to make some kind of ironic comment in their actions.

From the British perspective, the expulsions appeared just as cruel as the pogroms. All newspapers carried harrowing tales of dispossession, of helpless Jews in thrall to bigoted officials, and the wholesale destruction of synagogues and their congregations. As in 1881-1882, there was some exaggeration. But suffering was most embodied by the forced return of Moscow Jews to the Pale of Settlement, which in itself symbolised the entire Russian Jewish experience. Anglo-Jewish society was, naturally, incensed by the recurrence of anti-Jewish violence in Russia, albeit it in a different form to the pogroms. Various efforts were made to try and persuade the Tsarist regime onto a different course, including intervention at a diplomatic level. In addition,
the *Jewish Chronicle* published a separate supplement throughout 1891-1892, entitled ‘Darkest Russia’, which aimed specifically to publicise the plight of Russian Jewry.68

The expulsions were, of course, the direct consequence of Tsarist policy. In contrast to the pogroms, they were legally managed by both statutes and officials. No doubt, these actions proved that Tsarism’s overriding attitude towards its Jewish question was, at the very least, unsympathetic and, at worst, malicious. Certainly, this was a perspective widely shared in Britain. In ‘Darkest Russia’, one commentator pleaded with the Tsar to alleviate the untold misery of the Pale by dismantling the entire anti-Jewish legal structure ‘with a stroke of his pen’.69 But Alexander III, who was depicted as a murderous tyrant in a cartoon in *Punch* (London: see appendix, figure 4) did not heed these requests and instead, the legal proscriptions on Jewish life appeared to worsen with every year. As a result, the past (1881-1882) and present (1890-1892) experiences of Russian Jews were conflated, and hindsight facilitated the creation of an oppressive and singularly miserable narrative. Pogroms and expulsions were all of a piece. Violent, barbaric and anachronistic, they were government inspired, directed and implemented. And for this, Tsar Alexander III was to blame.

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69 Darkest Russia. 20/V/1892: 1, 5.
Figure 1: ‘Assault on Jews in Kiev’, Illustrated London News, 4 June 1881.

Figure 2: ‘Brandy Shop in Kiev’, Illustrated London News, 18 June 1881.
Figure 3: Front page of the Penny Illustrated News (London), 23 January 1882.
FROM THE NILE TO THE NEVA.

Shade of Pharaoh. “FORBEAR! THAT WEAPON ALWAYS WOUNDS THE HAND THAT WIELD IT.”

Figure 4: from Punch (London), 9 August 1890.
BIBLIOGRAHY


